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VIRGINIA SHOULD OPEN ITS COURTHOUSE DOORS TO





The framers of the Constitution agreed from the outset upon a
tripartite system of government.1 The separation of powers doc-
trine was adopted to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.
2
James Madison wrote that "accumulation of all powers, legislative,
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands may justly be pro-
nounced the very definition of tyranny."3 This distribution of pow-
ers among the three governmental branches checks abuses within
federal and state governments.4
Administrative law has been problematic for the separation of
powers doctrine. 5 Administrative agencies are part of the executive
branch, and are often delegated legislative authority in order to
effectuate agency functions and objectives.6 When agency case de-
cisions are insulated from judicial review, there is an increased
likelihood of inequitable and unjust agency actions.7 This lack of
* Law clerk to Magistrate Rebecca Beach Smith, United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia; B.S., 1983, Albright College; J.D., 1986, T.C. Williams School of
Law, University of Richmond.
** Senior Staff Attorney, Virginia Poverty Law Center, Inc.; B.S., 1973, Georgia State
University; J.D., 1977, Boston College School of Law. The author is working with Legal
Services and specializing in public benefits and related matters.
1. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 136 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter
CONSTruTIONAL LAW].
2. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See gener-
ally J. BARRON & C. DIENES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 267-68 (2d ed.
1982).
3. J. BARRON & C. DIENES, supra note 2, at 267 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324
(J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961)).
4. See U.S. CONST. arts. I, II & IlI; VA. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
5. See K. DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 1.08, at 23-25 (3d ed. 1972); see also
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (discussing the roles of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission).
6. See VA. CONST. art. V, § 9.
7. See infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
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judicial review exists in Virginia with respect to agency denial of
public assistance funds."
Recent Virginia decisions interpreting the Virginia Administra-
tive Process Act" (VAPA) have interpreted the subject exemption
section of VAPA to include agency actions regarding public assis-
tance, 10 thereby prohibiting judicial scrutiny of administrative de-
cisions which grant or deny public assistance." This statutory in-
terpretation effectively closes the courthouse door to persons
denied public assistance. Virginia is one of only three states which
fail to provide judicial review of public assistance eligibility
hearings.' 2
However, Virginia courts may review a wide range of other ad-
ministrative decisions, including issues regarding permits for septic
tanks, 13 zoning classifications, 4 and automobile license plates.15
The interest of an indigent individual in public assistance benefits
is certainly as significant as the interests people have in septic
8. For purposes of this article, "public assistance" shall refer to those programs enumer-
ated in VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-87 (Cum. Supp. 1985). The programs include the following:
(1) Fuel assistance. See VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-8 (Cum. Supp. 1985); 42 U.S.C. §
8621 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
(2) Auxiliary grants to the aged, blind, and disabled. See VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-25.1
(Repl. Vol. 1980 & Cum. Supp. 1985).
(3) Medical assistance. See id. § 63.1-25.2; 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
(4) Social services. See VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-55 (Repl. Vol. 1980 & Cum. Supp.
1985); 42 U.S.C. § 1397 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
(5) Aid to needy families with children. See VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-105 (Repl. Vol.
1980 & Cum. Supp. 1985); 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1982 & Supp. 1983).
(6) General assistance. See VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-106 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
9. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-6.14:1 to :25 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
10. As originally adopted in 1975, article five of VAPA contained subjects exempted from
the entire Act. See infra note 20. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:20 (Repl. Vol. 1978), provided in
pertinent part that "[tihere shall be exempted from the operation of this chapter any
agency action relating to the following subjects: ... (ii) grants of State or federal funds or
property." Id. In July, 1985, VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:20 was repealed by 1985 Va. Acts 602,
and the subject exemptions recodified at VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:4.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 1985).
This recodified version provides in pertinent part that "[a]gency action relating to the fol-
lowing subjects is exempted from the provisions of this chapter: .... 4. Grants of state or
federal funds or property." Id.
11. See, e.g., Harris v. Lukhard, 733 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1984). For the purposes of this
article, any reference to agency decisions "denying" or "regarding" public assistance is actu-
ally applicable to any agency action denying, modifying, granting, or terminating public
assistance.
12. See infra notes 142-46 and accompanying text for authorities for all fifty states.
13. See, e.g., Forbes v. Kenley, 227 Va. 55, 314 S.E.2d 49 (1984); State Bd. of Health v.
Godfrey, 223 Va. 423, 290 S.E.2d 875 (1982).
14. See, e.g., Board of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 216 S.E.2d 199 (1975).
15. See VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-61 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
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tanks and automobile license plates.'8 Virginia's failure to provide
adequate judicial redress worsens the plight of some of the com-
monwealth's most needy citizens and increases the possibility that
public assistance benefits may be wrongfully withheld by arbitrary
and capricious agency actions.17
This article advocates an interpretation of VAPA which would
permit judicial review of public assistance cases. This article also
will highlight the constitutional and public policy rationales which
require the implementation of such review procedures in Virginia.
Part II of the article traces the legal development of the present
interpretation and advocates a statutory construction which per-
mits judicial review under the present language of VAPA. Part III
addresses supremacy clause and due process concerns supporting
judicial review, and public policy arguments mandating it.
II. INTERPRETATION OF VAPA
A. Present Interpretation
Although the issue of judicial review of agency decisions denying
public assistance has not been addressed by the Virginia Supreme
Court," several Virginia circuit courtss have rejected judicial re-
view of agency decisions under Virginia Code section 9-6.14:20(ii),
the subject exemption section of VAPA.2 ° Section 9-6.14:20(ii) was
replaced in 1985 by section 9-6.14:4.1(B)(4), which contains the
same language as that of the former section.21 These circuit courts
have held that administrative agency decisions denying general re-
lief,22 hospitalization assistance,23 food stamps, aid to families with
dependent children (AFDC),24 and decisions canceling Medicaid
16. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the Court stated that "[b]y hypothesis, a
welfare recipient is destitute, without funds or assets." Id. at 261 (quoting Kelly v. Wyman,
294 F. Supp. 893, 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
17. See infra notes 85-140 and accompanying text.
18. See Harris v Lukhard, 733 F.2d 1075, 1082 (4th Cir. 1984).
19. See infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:20 (Repl. Vol. 1978). This section clearly provides that grants
of state or federal funds or property are exempted from the chapter. See supra note 10.
21. See supra note 10.
22. Taylor v. Virginia Dep't of Welfare, Ch. Order Book 12 at 257 (Greene County Cir. Ct.
Jan. 16, 1979) (dismissing appeal of denial of general relief).
23. Nesselrodt v. Virginia Dep't of Welfare, Ch. No. 80-C-82 (Culpeper County Cir. Ct.
Sept. 28, 1982) (upholding denial of application for hospital assistance).
24. Redd v. Virginia Dep't of Welfare, Law No. LE-1636 (Richmond City Cir. Ct. Sept. 2,
1982) (holding that a court is without jurisdiction to grant an appeal of a denial of AFDC
and food stamp benefits because these are exempt from judicial review).
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benefits2 5 are all decisions which relate to grants of state or federal
funds26 and are therefore exempted from judicial review under
VAPA by section 9-6.14:20(ii) of the Virginia Code.
In 1984, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit had its opportunity, in Harris v. Lukhard, s to decide whether
VAPA had any application to public assistance matters. Harris in-
volved a class action challenge to real estate assessment procedures
used in determining the eligibility of applicants for Medicaid. 29 Re-
lying partially upon circuit court cases,30 and partially upon an
opinion of the Virginia Attorney General, 31 the court ruled that
matters related to public assistance are exempted from VAPA by
virtue of the subject exemption section.32 The subject matter ex-
emption exempts from VAPA any agency decision that grants state
or federal funds or property. While acknowledging that the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court might have adhered to the statutory interpre-
tation advocated by the parties seeking public assistance,33 the
Court of Appeals held that its best judgment was exercised by fol-
lowing the circuit court decisions.3 4
25. White v. Madison County Dep't of Social Servs., Ch. No. 16-1710 (Madison County
Cir. Ct. Aug. 17, 1982) (order canceling Medicaid benefits sustained upon demurrers of
respondent).
26. See cases cited supra notes 22-25.
27. See supra note 20. Although all of these actions involve state or federal funds, the
authors opine that these programs are" specifically controlled by V. CODE ANN. § 9-
6.14:4.1(D)(3) (Repl. Vol. 1985) (formerly § 9-6.14:10(iii)), which "excludes" grants or deni-
als of public assistance from VAPA article three (Case Decisions). This necessarily would
include grants or denials of public assistance in the remainder of VAPA (including article
four (Court Review)).
28. 733 F.2d 1075.
29. Id. at 1076-77. This article will not address the substantive merits of the challenges to
the assessment procedures used, but rather will focus on the right to have the resulting
denials of public assistance judicially reviewed.
30. Id. at 1082; see supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
31. Harris, 733 F.2d at 1082. There are three Virginia Attorney General Opinions on
point. The first, 1977-78 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 1-3 (1977), issued by former Attorney General
Anthony F. Troy, favored an interpretation of VAPA which permitted judicial review of
administrative agency hearings in public assistance cases. This position was reversed in two
separate 1982 opinions by Attorney General Gerald Baliles. 1982-83 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 11-
12 (1982); 1982-83 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 757-60 (1982). These opinions were issued by the
Attorney General during the period between the district court's decision in Harris and the
case's appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Interestingly, the Attorney
General's office was representing the appellee in the pending appeal.
32. Harris, 733 F.2d at 1081-82. For content of VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:20(ii) (Repl. Vol.
1978) see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
33. This statutory construction will be advanced in Part II, Section B of this article. See
infra notes 44-70 and accompanying text. It should be noted that co-author Jill A. Hanken
served as co-counsel for plaintiffs in Harris.
34. Harris, 733 F.2d at 1082; see supra notes 2-25 and accompanying text.
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The plaintiffs in Harris argued that if the general "grant-of-
funds" exemption exempts grants of public assistance from VAPA
articles two, three and four, 5 then the specific exclusion of public
assistance under article three serves no function. The court recog-
nized that the plaintiff's argument was "plausible as a matter of
statutory construction," but the court nevertheless declined to ac-
cept it.36 Instead, the court stated that "[i]t seems most unlikely
that the Legislature intended judicial review of denials of public
assistance, and the only apparent way to avoid such review is to
apply the grant-of-funds exemption as the circuit courts have
done. ' 37 In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals ignored
established principles of statutory construction in favor of what it
perceived to be legislative intent. The resultant denial of judicial
review is inequitable and violative of the legislative purpose.3 8
Where questions of state law have not been addressed by the
state's highest court, federal courts necessarily must forecast what
the state supreme court would hold if presented with the issue.3 9
While federal courts should give "proper regard" to decisions of
state trial courts, federal courts are not obligated to follow those
decisions.40 However, federal courts interpreting VAPA are re-
quired to use principles of statutory construction that the Virginia
Supreme Court would use in construing VAPA.41
In reaching its decision in Harris, the Court of Appeals chose to
follow closely the pertinent decisions of Virginia's circuit courts.42
However, the court failed to adhere to principles of statutory con-
35. Harris, 733 F.2d at 1082.
36. Id. (noting that no Virginia Supreme Court cases addressed the issue; further o Vir-
ginia circuit court cases followed the plaintiffs' construction).
37. Id.
38. For a more detailed analysis of the authors' opinion complete with factor analysis, see
infra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
39. Wilson v. Ford Motor Co., 656 F.2d 960 (4th Cir. 1981) (citing Commissioner v. Estate
of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1976); McChung v. Ford Motor Co., 492 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1973)).
Under such circumstances, it also may be appropriate for the federal court to abstain from
adjudicating the issue until the state supreme court has had an opportunity to do so. See
CA WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52 (3d ed. 1976). A discussion of
federal abstention doctrines is beyond the scope of this article.
40. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. at 464-65.
41. See United States v. Guyette, 382 F. Supp. 1266, 1268 (E.D. Va. 1974).
42. Harris, 733 F.2d at 1082. For a discussion of these circuit court cases, see supra notes
22-25 and accompanying text.
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struction. If the court had applied statutory construction princi-
ples followed by the Virginia Supreme Court, it would have con-
cluded that VAPA does indeed provide for judicial review of
agency hearings related to public assistance.4
B. Proposed Interpretation
VAPA was adopted in 1975"" to replace the General Administra-
tive Agencies Act (GAAA), which had governed administrative pro-
cedures in Virginia since 1952."5 GAAA specifically exempted "the
46Unethreceipt of public assistance" from all of its provisions. Under the
express language of GAAA, agency decisions denying public assis-
tance were not subject to judicial review.4
However, when VAPA was adopted, the total public assistance
exclusion was not retained.4 8 Instead, VAPA excluded denials of
public assistance only from article three of the Act, which governed
case decisions.49 Amendments adopted in 1985 recodified this sec-
tion.50 Actions of the General Assembly must be deemed inten-
tional, and provisions which are omitted in a revised act may not
be revived by statutory construction. 1 In revising the law, the
43. See infra notes 55-70 and accompanying text. As previously stated, the majority in
Harris admitted that this argument "is plausible as a matter of statutory construction."
Harris, 733 F.2d at 1082.
44. 1975 Va. Acts 503.
45. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-6.1 to .14 (Cum. Supp. 1954). The repeal of the GAAA is noted
under the heading General Administrative Agencies Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-6.1 to .14
(Repl. Vol. 1978).
46. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.2(d) (Cum. Supp. 1954).
47. Id.
48. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.2 (Cum. Supp. 1952) with VA. CODE ANN. § 6.14:20
(Repl. Vol. 1978) (enumerating subjects exempted from the act).
49. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:10(iii) (Repl. Vol. 1978) provided that "[ihis article [article
three (Case Decisions)] shall not apply to case decisions respecting ... (iii) the grant or
denial of public assistance."
50. This section is presently codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:4.1(D)(3) (Repl. Vol.
1985).
51. See Godlewski v. Gray, 221 Va. 1092, 277 S.E.2d 213 (1981). The court stated:
We invoke the elementary rule of statutory construction that when, as here, a statute
... is revised, or when, as here one act is framed from another, and portions of the
former are omitted, the missing part will not be revived by statutory construction
but will be considered as annulled and revoked. A contrary holding would have to be
based on a presumption that the omission was inadvertent and would require us to
'impute to the legislature gross carelessness, or ignorance,' an exercise in which we
will not engage.
Id. at 1096, 277 S.E.2d at 215-16 (emphasis added) (citing Combined Saw & Planner Co. v.
Flournoy, 88 Va. 1029, 1034, 143 S.E. 976, 977 (1892) (quoting Ellis v. Paige, 18 Mass. (1
Pick.) 43, 45 (1823))).
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General Assembly specifically and deliberately removed "public as-
sistance" from the overall subject exemption section and instead
excluded "public assistance" from the operation of article three
only.
In Harris,2 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted
VAPA as exempting grants or denials of public assistance from the
entire VAPA by the subject exemption clause.53 This rendered the
exemption in article three superfluous and without effect.5 4 This
result is unsupportable under established rules of statutory
construction.
Principles of statutory construction require that every word and
clause of a statute be given effect where possible.5 5 In VEPCO v.
Board of County Supervisors," the Virginia Supreme Court held
that "[w]henever possible, . . . it is our duty to interpret the sev-
eral parts of a statute as a consistent and harmonious whole so as
to effectuate the legislative goal. '5 7 The two sections interpreted
by the court in Harris, sections 9-6.14:20(ii) and 9-6.14:10(iii), 5s
can be read together without conflict. To give both of the VAPA
provisions effect, it is clear that the "exemption" in section 9-
6.14:20(ii)5" and the "exclusion" in section 9-6.14:10(iii)eO must ad-
dress two independent VAPA issues: grants of state or federal
52. Harris v. Lukhard, 733 F.2d 1075, 1082 (4th Cir. 1984).
53. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:20(ii) (Repl. Vol. 1978) provided that "Itihere shall be ex-
empted from the operation of this chapter [VAPA] any agency action relating to the follow-
ing subjects: ... (ii) grants of State or federal funds or property." The subject exemption
clause was later recodified. See id. § 9-6.14:4.1(B)(4) (Repl. Vol. 1985). For a more detailed
discussion of this new codification, see infra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
54. If VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:20(ii) is interpreted as exempting "public assistance" cases
from the totality of VAPA (including article three (Case Decisions)), then § 9-6.14:4.1(D)(3),
which specifically excludes public assistance cases from article three provisions, is rendered
absolutely meaningless. It is unlikely that the General Assembly would specifically remove
"public assistance" cases from one article of VAPA when it was going to completely remove
them from every article of the Act.
55. See United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955); see also United States v.
Snider, 502 F.2d 645, 652 (4th Cir. 1974). In Snider, the Court of Appeals held that "all
parts of the statute must be read together, neither taking specific words out of context, nor
interpreting one part so as to render another meaningless." Snider, 502 F.2d at 652 (em-
phasis added) (citation omitted) (citing United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S.
534, 542-43 (1940)); Helvering v. Morgan's Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 126 (1934).
56. 226 Va. 382, 309 S.E.2d 308 (1983).
57. Id. at 387-88, 309 S.E.2d at 311. The court further stated that "a statute is not to be
construed by singling out a particular phrase." Id. at 388, 309 S.E.2d at 311 (citing VEPCO
v. Citizens for Safe Power, 222 Va. 866, 869, 284 S.E.2d 613, 615 (1981)).
58. See Harris, 733 F.2d at 1081-82.
59. See supra note 10.
60. See supra note 49.
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funds and grants or denials of public assistance, respectively.61
Recent organizational and substantive alterations to VAPA sup-
port this interpretation.2 As of July 1, 1985, both exemptions and
exclusions from VAPA were provided for in a single statute: sec-
tion 9-6.14:4.1(B)(4) of the Virginia Code. 3 This section continues
to exempt grants of state or federal funds or property from the
entire Act.6 4 Subsection D of this section provides that "[t]he fol-
lowing agency actions otherwise subject to [VAPA] are excluded
from the operation of Article 3 [Case Decisions] . . . of [VAPA]:
. . . [t]he grant or denial of public assistance. 6 5 The addition of
the explanatory phrase "agency actions otherwise subject to
[VAPA]" expressly indicates that actions excluded from article
three are otherwise subject to VAPA, including article four. 6
This addendum removes any ambiguity that may have existed in
61. The Reviser's Note to VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:20 (Repl. Vol. 1978) refers to the differ-
entiation between the exemption contained therein and other provisions: "Article 5 makes
obvious self-explanatory exemptions from the whole chapter. Note, however, that there are
other kinds of exceptions."
62. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-6.14:20(ii), :10(iii) (Repl. Vol. 1978) have been consolidated into a
single section of VAPA. See VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:4.1 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
63. This consolidation should aid the court in interpreting the intent of the sections
together.
64. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:4.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 1985) provides that "[a]gency action relat-
ing to the following subjects is exempted from the provisions of this chapter: . . . 4. Grants
of state or federal funds or property." It should be noted that the phraseology of former § 9-
6.14:20 is substantially the same as the phraseology of the present statute. See supra note
10 for context of VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:20 (Repl. Vol. 1978).
65. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:4.1(D) (Repl. Vol. 1985) (emphasis added). Other agency ac-
tion precluded from the operation of VAPA article three includes: the award or denial of
claims for workers' compensation; the award or denial of individual student loans by the
Virginia Education Loan Authority; and the determination of applications for guaranty of
individual student loans or the determination of default claims by the State Education As-
sistance Authority. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:4.1(D) (Repl. Vol. 1985). Agency decisions re-
garding awards or denials of workers' compensation and student loans certainly involve
"grants of state or federal funds." Therefore, using the statutory construction employed in
Harris, the above-mentioned actions would be exempt from all of VAPA. See Harris, 733
F.2d at 1075; see also supra notes 28-43 and accompanying text. It seems to run counter to
common sense to believe that the General Assembly expressly excluded from article three
several types of agency actions otherwise subject to VAPA, since within the same section
the General Assembly already had exempted those agency actions from the entire VAPA.
This statutory construction is not acceptable under present law. See infra notes 66-70 and
accompanying text.
66. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:10 (Repl. Vol. 1978) (stating that "[t]his article shall
not apply to case decisions respecting . . . (iii) the grant or denial of public assistance) with
id. § 9-6.14:4.1(D) (Repl. Vol. 1985) (citation omitted) (stating that "[t]he following agency
actions otherwise subject to this chapter are excluded from the operation of Article 3 of this
chapter: . . . [t]he grant or denial of public assistance").
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the earlier statute, and must be deemed intentional.6 7 Reading sec-
tion 9-6.14:4.18 as a whole," and giving the plain and ordinary
meaning to its words where the words are unambiguous,70 it is
clear that denials of public assistance are subject to judicial review
under VAPA. Future litigation on this issue should be decided
accordingly.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND PUBLIC POLICY RATIONALES IMPLORING
JUDICIAL REVIEW
If the statutory interpretation advocated in Part II of this arti-
cle 1 is rejected by the courts, several constitutional and public pol-
icy rationales mandate that the Virginia General Assembly provide
for judicial review of administrative agency decisions regarding
public assistance. From a constitutional perspective, the present
interpretation of Virginia law contradicts an implementing regula-
tion of at least one federally funded public assistance program 2
and violates, at a minimum, the spirit of the United States Su-
preme Court decisions addressing due process rights arising from
public assistance programs." The present interpretation is inequi-
table because it fails to protect those members of our society who
are most vulnerable to arbitrary or unlawful exertions of power. 4
A. Constitutional Concerns
Federal courts have invalidated state public assistance statutes
when the statutes contradict federal requirements and thus violate
67. See Godlewski, 221 Va. at 1096, 277 S.E.2d at 216; see also supra note 51.
68. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:4.1 (RepL Vol. 1985).
69. See Board of County Supervisors, 226 Va. 382, 309 S.E.2d 308 (1983); see also supra
notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
70. See Temple v. City of Petersburg, 182 Va. 418, 423, 29 S.E.2d 357, 358 (1944) (stating
that "[i]f the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, and its meaning perfectly
clear and definite, effect must be given to it regardless of what courts think of its wisdom or
policy"); see also Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979); Ambrogi v. Koontz, 224
Va. 381, 297 S.E.2d 660 (1982).
71. See supra notes 44-70 and accompanying text.
72. For a discussion of the 1982 Food Stamp Act, see infra notes 76-77 and accompanying
text.
73. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (holding that welfare benefits, as
a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them, are not subject to
termination without due process). For a more in-depth discussion of this proposition, see
infra notes 85-97 and accompanying text.
74. This proposition is the predominant concern of the authors and serves as the motivat-
ing factor behind the drafting of this article.
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the supremacy clause. 75 A regulation governing the Food Stamp
Program 7' specifically addresses judicial review of agency decisions.
Section 273.15(q)(3)(i) of the Code of Federal Regulations provides
that "[a]fter a State level hearing decision which upholds the State
agency action, the household shall be notified of the right to pur-
sue judicial review of the decision."' 77 This regulation presupposes
the existence of a right to judicial review.7s Accordingly, the pre-
sent interpretation of VAPA precluding judicial review violates
the federal regulations ° to the extent that agency hearings deny-
ing food stamp benefits are involved, and concomitantly violates
the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution."' At a
minimum, Virginia should be compelled to adhere to this federal
law and provide for judicial review of agency hearings denying food
stamp benefits.
A second constitutional objection to the denial of judicial review
is that such a denial violates due process of law. The fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no
state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law."'8 2 Two questions must be answered to ascer-
tain whether the denial of judicial review constitutes a due process
violation. First, do the rights of individuals eligible for public assis-
tance constitute "interests" which are protected by the fifth and
fourteenth amendments? s Second, do the procedures presently
employed by Virginia satisfy due process requirements? 4
The answer to the first inquiry is yes. The "property" protected
by the fourteenth amendment has never been interpreted as being
75. See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (invalidating Alabama "substitute fa-
ther" regulation under which mother who cohabitated lost AFDC benefits); J.A. v. Riti, 377
F. Supp. 1046 (D.N.J. 1974) (invalidating New Jersey statute which granted an administra-
tive agency discretionary power to remove persons convicted of welfare fraud from AFDC
programs, because a state cannot remove otherwise eligible individuals from federal relief
programs); Lawson v. Brown, 349 F. Supp. 203 (W.D. Va. 1972) (invalidating a Virginia
AFDC eligibility statute because it imposed higher requirements than the federal statute).
76. 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1982).
77. 7 C.F.R. § 273.15(q)(3)(i) (1985) (emphasis added).
78. It should be noted that the regulation does not contain any language implying that
the right of judicial review is contingent upon state law providing for such.
79. See supra notes 22-25, 28.
80. 7 C.F.R. § 273.15(q)(3)(i) (1985).
81. See supra note 73 (state violation of federal requirements violates supremacy clause).
82. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
83. For a discussion of this question, see infra notes 85-108 and accompanying text.
84. For a discussion of this question, see infra notes 116-40 and accompanying text.
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restricted to rights of undisputed ownership.8 5 Instead, this protec-
tion extends to "any significant property interest,"86 including
statutory entitlements.8 7 In Goldberg v. Kelly,"' the United States
Supreme Court attached this "statutory entitlement" status to the
continued receipt of welfare benefits by eligible persons.89
Goldberg involved a due process challenge to a New York statute
which permitted federal aid to families with dependent children
(AFDC) to be terminated without prior notice and hearing.90 The
Court held that the state termination procedures were unconstitu-
tional,9' and declared that public assistance benefits are important
rights, not merely privileges.92 More importantly, the Court held
that "[welfare] benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for
persons qualified to receive them,"93 and that procedural due pro-
cess is therefore applicable to their termination."
85. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972) (involving rights to property acquired
under conditional sales contracts).
86. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971).
87. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 86.
88. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
89. Id. at 262.
90. Id. at 255-60. It should be noted that New York law did provide for judicial review of
a hearing decision which did not restore the AFDC benefits. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§
7801-7806 (McKinney 1963).
91. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266-68 (holding that the existing posttermination "fair hearing"
and informal pretermination review were insufficient).
92. Id. at 262 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969)).
93. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262. It is sometimes presumed that due process guarantees ap-
ply only when a property interest is "presently enjoyed." See J. BARRON & C. DIENas, supra
note 2, at 380. However, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found the expectation
of benefits by an applicant to be a sufficient interest to deserve due process protection. See
Griffith v. Detrick, 603 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 970 (1980). The court
emphasized the mandatory language of the authorizing statute and the very limited discre-
tion of agency officials in granting assistance due to the definite eligibility criteria estab-
lished by the implementing regulations. Griffith, 603 F.2d at 121-22. This decision suggests
that enabling statutes and implementing regulations "may be so specific as to create an
expectation that should be accompanied by... due process rights." J. BARRON & C. DIENES,
supra note 2, at 380.
Virginia's enabling statutes for assistance programs and, more particularly, its implement-
ing regulations, are extremely detailed and specific. They create a legitimate claim of enti-
tlement and expectancy of benefits in persons claiming to meet the eligibility requirements.
Arguably, the interest in such benefits is a property interest and may not be denied without
due process. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-310 to -320 (Repl. Vol. 1985); id. § 63.1-105 to -
106 (Repl. Vol. 1980); Virginia Department of Social Services Medicaid Manual (1975) (ena-
bling statute and implementing regulations for Medicaid program); Virginia Department of
Social Services, ADC Policy and Procedure Manual (1974) (enabling statute and implement-
ing regulations for AFDC).
94. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262-63.
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If an individual has a protected statutory entitlement in the
continued receipt of welfare benefits, then that individual has a
"quasi-property '1 5 interest in the receipt of such benefits. 96 The
individual's interests in, and the government's functions pertaining
to, the initial extension and continued receipt of welfare benefits
are identical.9 7 Since the continued receipt of welfare benefits mer-
its procedural due process protection, the initial extension of the
same benefits merits the same procedural protections.9 "
In addition to public policy rationales justifying identical treat-
ment, several recent Supreme Court cases appear to require identi-
cal treatment. In Board of Regents v. Roth,9 the Supreme Court
identified certain attributes of property interests, within the pur-
view of due process protection, which have evolved from earlier
Court decisions.100 For a property interest to arise from a claim to
a benefit, the individual must have more than a unilateral expecta-
tion of receiving the benefit. He must have "a legitimate claim of
entitlement to it."''1 The Court in Roth stated that the entitle-
95. See id. at 262 n.8 (Brennan, J.) (citing Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare:
The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965)).
96. See supra note 93. See generally Dolzer, Welfare Benefits as Property Interests: A
Constitutional Right to a Hearing and Judicial Reveiw, 29 AD. L. REv. 525 (1977).
97. See Dolzer, supra note 96, at 526-37.
98. This conclusion has been reached by federal courts. See, e.g., Parker v. Califano, 644
F.2d 1199 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding that administrative res judicata may constitute a denial
of due process when a colorable constitutional question has been raised); Gosnell v. Harris,
521 F. Supp. 956 (S.D. Ohio 1981), afl'd., 703 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that once an
individual applies for Social Security benefits, he has a procedurally protected interest in
obtaining them). But see Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 659-60 (1973) (indirectly sug-
gesting that administrative actions do not give rise to a constitutional right to judicial re-
view); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970) (refusing to classify welfare benefits
as fundamental interests). See generally Brudno, Fairness and Bureaucracy: The Demise of
Procedural Due Process for Welfare Claimants, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 813 (1974).
99. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). Roth involved a state university teacher who had not been re-
hired at the end of a fixed term employment contract, without explanation. The Court held
that no due process protection need be given since no property or liberty interest was in-
volved. Id. at 579.
100. Id. at 576-77. The earlier Court decisions include: Connell v. Higginbotham, 403
U.S. 207 (1971) (implied promise of continued employment gives rise to due process protec-
tion); Goldberg, 397 U.S. 254 (statutory entitlement in welfare benefits requires pretermina-
tion hearing); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (no accrued property rights in Social
Security benefits).
101. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. The Court stated:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an
abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it.
He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the
ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their
daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined.
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ment of the welfare recipients in Goldberg was "grounded in the
statute defining eligibility thereby creating a property interest. 1 02
Although the claimants in Goldberg had not yet proven their stat-
utory eligibility, they had a "right to a hearing at which they might
attempt to do So. '103 By analogy, individuals satisfying statutory
eligibility requirements for other forms of public assistance like-
wise have a legitimate claim of entitlement grounded in the statute
defining eligibility, and therefore should have a right to a hearing
to prove their legitimate claim.
The most recent United States Supreme Court case on point
does not differentiate between property rights in the initial and
continued receipt of public assistance. Atkins v. Parker'0 4 involved
notice requirements necessary to effectuate food stamp benefit re-
ductions. The Court stated that, like welfare benefits, food stamp
benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified
to receive them.1 0 5 Atkins unconditionally held that these "entitle-
ments are appropriately treated as a form of property protected by
the Due Process Clause"; 0 6 thus, the procedures used to determine
continued eligibility must comply with the requirements of the
United States Constitution.0 It is suggested here that, under At-
kins, an eligible individual has an entitlement "property" interest
in the initial receipt, as well as the continued receipt, of public
assistance benefits. 08
The second question to answer is whether the procedures used in
Virginia satisfy due process requirements. 109 The United States
102. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. The same statutes define initial eligibility and continued eligi-
bility. Id.
103. Id.; see also Singer v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 616, 618 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that the
rejection of a second application for survival benefits under the Social Security Act without
an opportunity to present its merits constituted a denial of due process).
104. 105 S. Ct. 2520 (1985).
105. Id. at 2529 (citing Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262).
106. Atkins, 105 S. Ct. at 2529.
107. Id. See generally CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 549-50; Reich, Individual
Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965).
108. This article addresses judicial review of administrative agency decisions denying,
modifying, granting, or terminating public assistance. See supra note 11. Virginia's preclu-
sion of judicial review encompasses all of these types of agency actions. Thus, even if Vir-
ginia rejects the interpretation of Atkins advocated herein, agency actions modifying or ter-
minating benefits are absolutely entitled to due process protection under Goldberg.
Therefore, at a minimum, some Virginia administrative agency actions not subject to judi-
cial review involve "property" rights protected by the due process clause.
109. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. While the administrative hearing proce-
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Supreme Court has articulated a balancing of interests test to as-
certain the procedural protections applicable to a particular situa-
tion. In Mathews v. Eldridge,'" the Court emphasized three fac-
tors which should be considered in identifying the specific
requirements of due process:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's in-
terest, including the function involved and the fiscal and adminis-
trative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural require-
ment would entail. 1 '
An explanation of the present agency hearing procedures is mer-
ited before the Mathews test is analyzed. The State Board of So-
cial Services (the "Board") 1 2 has authority to review any decision
granting, denying, changing, or discontinuing public assistance
upon appeal of the aggrieved applicant or recipient." 3 The Board
may delegate its review responsibilities to hearing officers who pre-
side over administrative hearings and render subsequent decisions.
Any party dissatisfied with a hearing officer's decision may request
review by the Board." 4 The Board's decision is final, and not sub-
ject to further review or appeal, except on the Board's own
motion. 115
However, administrative review of agency decisions concerning
Medical Assistance (Medicaid) is handled independently by the
Department of Medical Assistance Services." 6 A team of hearing
officers presides over the hearings, makes findings of fact, and rec-
ommends a decision to the Medical Assistance Program Appeals
dures could be altered to satisfy due process, the authors feel that judicial review is a supe-
rior avenue. It is worth noting that 47 states addressing the due process questions in similar
situations have provided for judicial review. See infra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
110. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
111. Id. at 335.
112. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-14 (Cur. Supp. 1985). The Board is comprised of nine mem-
bers who are appointed by the Governor.
113. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-116 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
114. Id. Such review is conducted by a three member committee of the Board. Id.
115. Id. § 63.1-119 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
116. The Department of Medical Assistance Services was established by VA. CODE ANN.
§ 32.1-323 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
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Board (the "Appeals Board").117 The Appeals Board has the op-
tions of accepting the recommendations of the hearing officer,
reaching its own conclusions, or referring the matter back to the
hearing officer for continuation of the hearing."" Although the Ap-
peals Board may reconsider its decision if new evidence becomes
available, no other administrative reviews of Appeals Board deci-
sions are allowed. 19
The Mathews analysis is comprised of three components. The
first component, the private interest that will be affected, 20 is
clearly an important interest to both the individual and society. To
the individual, public assistance represents minimal subsistence
support for the essentials of life. 2' To society, "welfare guards
against the societal malaise that may flow from a widespread sense
of unjustified frustration and insecurity.' 1 22 The degree of proce-
dural due process protection merited in a particular situation de-
pends upon the extent to which an individual will be "condemned
to suffer grievous loss. ''123 Therefore, from the perspective of the
private interest affected, agency actions impacting on minimum
subsistence support should be afforded a high degree of procedural
protection, including judicial scrutiny. 24
The second component, the risk of error and the value of addi-
tional procedural safeguards, 2 5 also merits judicial review. Risk of
error is increased by the lack of total impartiality in the agency
determination. This does not suggest any moral or ethical defi-
ciency on the part of the hearing officials, but instead recognizes
the fundamental differences between an agency hearing official and
a judge. An agency official attempts to serve three roles: (1) impar-
tial decisionmaker; (2) representative of the claimant; and (3) rep-
117. Virginia Department of Social Services, The Virginia Medicaid Manual § 806 (1985).
118. Id. § 806.5.
119. Id.
120. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; see supra note 102 and accompanying text.
121. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 265. This assistance can provide the poor with the same
opportunities that are available to others, allowing them to participate meaningfully in com-
munity life. Id.
122. Id. The Goldberg court also stated that "[p]ublic assistance . . .is not mere charity,
but a means to 'promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to our-
selves and our Posterity.'" Id.
123. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
124. Dolzer, supra note 96, at 558-59. The function of judicial review is to ensure that the
agency correctly applies the statutes in specific cases.
125. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
1986]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
resentative of the agency. 126 Because of these multiple roles, the
agency official's perspective tends to be more society-oriented,
whereas judges are more concerned with the rights of individu-
als. 127 Since due process demands impartiality of those who func-
tion in judicial capacities, 28 the potentially conflicting concerns of
an agency hearing official encourage the implementation of judicial
review procedures.
In this respect, Virginia's system of administrative review of
agency actions is particularly inadequate. The final decisionmaker
for the Department of Social Services is a board composed of nine
political appointees. 29 In Medicaid cases, a team of state employ-
ees and policy makers issue the only decision, without the benefit
of observing witnesses or the hearing proceedings.3 0
The final component to the Mathews test is the interest of the
government, including the fiscal and administrative burdens of ad-
ditional procedures.' 3 ' One governmental interest is to promote so-
cietal harmony by providing minimal subsistence support to indi-
viduals. 13 2 In Goldberg, the Supreme Court addressed the fiscal
and administrative concerns that relate to the administration of
public assistance. 3 The Court in Goldberg stated that "these gov-
ernmental interests are not overriding in the welfare context.
13 4
Moreover, judicial review would increase the burden on agencies
and courts only slightly. In South Carolina, for example, where
public assistance cases are subject to judicial review, only thirty-
three client appeals were filed between 1982 and 1985. 31
126. See Marshaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Litiga-
tion Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of
Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNLL L. REV. 772, 788 (1974).
127. See Dolzer, supra note 96, at 561. This article further suggests that the individual's
interests are protected by an "enlightened" element on an administrative level, and by the
impartiality of the judge on the judicial level. See id. at 543-59.
128. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982) (applying to judicial and quasi-judi-
cial hearings); see also Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271.
129. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
131. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; see supra note 111 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
133. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. 254 (specifically addressing those fiscal and administrative
concerns relating to welfare benefits).
134. Id. at 266. The Court noted that the state could employ various techniques to mini-
mize the increased cost, including prompt determinations and efficient use of personnel and
facilities. Id.
135. See 4 South Carolina Legal Services Association, The Support Report (1985)
(monthly update for South Carolina Legal Services staff).
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Balancing the three components of the Mathews test--the vital
individual interests at stake,136 the significant protection which ju-
dicial review would provide against the arbitrariness, 137 and the
nominal fiscal burdens which would ensue 3BS--makes it apparent
that procedural due process requires Virginia to provide judicial
review of administrative agency decisions affecting public assis-
tance benefits. 39 Although the procedures utilized by Virginia do
provide some degree of due process protection, 4 ° the decisions in
Goldberg and Mathews indicate that more extensive protection is
required. This additional protection is best provided by a system
of judicial review.
B. Concerns of Fairness and Equity
In addition to the due process basis for requiring judicial review
of administrative decisions regarding public assistance, several
public policy considerations dictate the implementation of judicial
review. The interests analyzed in the previous section14 ' are appli-
cable to this proposition. However, the magnitude of the individual
interests at stake, the absence of any judicial check on the poten-
tial for abuses of discretion, and traditional notions of fairness and
equity require that judicial review be provided.
An examination of the procedures utilized in other states is in-
structive in ascertaining which procedures satisfy "traditional no-
tions of fairness" and advance positive public objectives. Such an
examination reveals that Virginia, Texas, and Ohio are the only
states which do not provide for judicial review of administrative
agency hearings in public assistance cases.14 2 Thirty-six states and
136. See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text
137. See supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
139. It has been suggested that the nature of the interests at stake render appellate re-
view an ineffective check on abuses of power. See Marshaw, supra note 126, at 812-15 (sug-
gesting that a management system is needed to assure adjudication safeguards).
140. See supra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 75-140 and accompanying text.
142. In Texas, public assistance cases are specifically exempted from the Texas Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. Tax. Rsv. Crv. STAT. ANN. Art. 6252-13A (Vernon Supp. 1986). Texas
courts have not assumed jurisdiction of these cases. See, e.g., Hackney v. Meade, 466 S.W.2d
341, 342 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
In Ohio, the Court of Claims has no jurisdiction to review denials of public assistance
benefits. See Bolin v. White, 51 Ohio App. 2d 92, -, 367 N.E.2d 63, 65 (1976). However,
when money damages are incurred as a result of an agency's failure to meet its statutory
obligations, a claim is permitted. See Morris v. Creasey, Law No. 79AP-410 (Ct. App.,
Franklin County, Va., February 14, 1980).
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the District of Columbia provide for judicial review of public assis-
tance cases through their state's administrative process acts.'43 Six
states utilize judicial review statutes outside of their administra-
tive process acts.4 Two states provide for judicial review through
court rules.145 Three states provide review through a certiorari
procedure. 48
The fact that Virginia is one of only three states which does not
provide for judicial review demonstrates that its position is out of
synchronization with contemporary thought. Virginia's position in
the extreme minority does not in and of itself mandate an altera-
tion. However, Virginia's deviation from mainstream practice does
indicate that Virginia's procedures do not meet traditional notions
of fairness in the view of the overwhelming majority of states. Vir-
143. These 36 states include: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See ALA. CODE § 41-22-20
(Repl. Vol. 1982); ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.300 (1982); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-901 to -910
(1982); ARK. STAT. ANN § 5-713 (Cum. Supp. 1985); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10962 (West
1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-106 (Repl. Vol. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4-183 (West Supp.
1985); D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-210.13 (Cum. Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.68 (West Supp.
1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-19 (1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 91-14 (Repl. Vol. 1976 & Supp.
1984); IDAHO CODE § 67-5215 (Cum. Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 3-101 to -112
(Smith-Hurd 1983 & Supp. 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-22-1-14 (Burns Supp. 1985); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 77-606 to -623 (1984); LA. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 46:107(D) (West 1982); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 11001; id. tit. 22, § 4322 (Cum. Supp. 1985); MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN.
§ 10-215 (1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 14 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1983); MICH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 400.37 (West 1976 & Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256.045 (West
1982); Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.100 (1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-701 (1984); NEB. REV. STAT. §
84-917 (1981); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 7801 (McKinney 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-79(k)
(Cum. Supp. 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-15 (Cum. Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 183.480
(1985); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 762(a) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1985); RI. GEN. LAWS § 42-35-
15 (Cum. Supp. 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-150 (Law. Co-op. 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 1-26-30.2 (1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-322 (Repl. Vol. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE §
34.04.130 (Cum. Supp. 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 227.15 (West Supp. 1985); Wyo. STAT. § 16-
3-114 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
144. These six states include Delaware, Kentucky, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma and
Vermont. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 520 (Repl. Vol. 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. § 205.234
(Cum. Supp. 1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 422.294 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27-3-4 (Repl. Vol.
1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 56, § 168(c) (West Supp. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §
3091(f),(g) (1985).
145. These two states are New Jersey and Utah. See N.J. CT. R. 2:2-3(a)(2); UTAH R. APP.
P. 14.
146. These three states are Mississippi, New Hampshire and West Virginia. See Harrison
v. Ginsberg, 286 S.E.2d 276, 282-84 (W. Va. 1982); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-51-95 (Cure. Supp.
1985) (review limited to errors of law); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-A:16 (Cum. Supp. 1986)
(review limited to errors of law); W. VA. CODE § 53-3-1 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
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ginia should provide for judicial review, not for the purpose of re-
linquishing its minority status, but rather to provide its indigents
deserved additional protection.
Insulating administrative agency decisions from judicial review
vests the agency with executive, legislative, and judicial functions,
and thus violates the separation of powers doctrine. Without judi-
cial review to help prevent arbitrary decisions and abuses of power,
there are no systematic external procedures to check the agency's
exercise of authority in specific cases.147 An individual faced with a
denial of benefits based on misapplication of the law or a misun-
derstanding of the facts by the agency is without redress. Further-
more, one of the functions of the judiciary, enhancing conformity
and predictability in the application of the law, is absent. 148
IV. CONCLUSION
The importance of the interests of individuals in need of, and
eligible for, public assistance cannot be overemphasized. Unwar-
ranted deprivation of public assistance benefits may deprive an eli-
gible claimant of the means for survival. ' 9 The potential for injus-
tice is simply too significant to ignore or reject because of nominal
fiscal burdens.1 50 If Virginia can justify providing judicial review
for persons dissatisfied with agency decisions regarding automobile
license plates and septic tank permits,1 51 it should provide the
same for decisions affecting the lives of public assistance claimants.
Virginia must alter, either judicially or legislatively,152 its posi-
tion of precluding judicial review of administrative agency deci-
sions in public assistance cases. Such a change is necessary to con-
form Virginia's procedures with the policies of fairness, as
evidenced by the overwhelming majority of sister states. Allowing
judicial review of agency decisions affecting public assistance
147. See supra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
148. See Dolzer, supra note 96, at 558-59.
149. Id. at 559.
150. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970); see also supra text accompanying
notes 135-39.
151. See supra notes 13 & 15 and accompanying text.
152. Although it did not make any recommendations, the 1985 Regulatory Reform Advi-
sory Board did encourage the Virginia General Assembly to consider this issue. See The
Governor's Regulatory Reform Advisory Board Final Report 2 (1985). Such a bill was
presented to the General Assembly in 1986, S.266, 1986 Seas., but the bill was dismissed in
committee.
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claimants will help guarantee the commonwealth's indigents all the
protections provided by state and federal law.
